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2.1Introduction
Corporate restructurings through hostile takeover, merger, or man-
agement buyout are wealth enhancing in the sense that the combined
market value of the acquiring and the acquired companies usually rises.
Many economists, notably Jensen (1984), have argued that the large
premia received by corporate shareholders derive from the improved
management and increased efficiency brought about by restructunngs.
These economists point to the increase in market value created by
takeovers as evidence of the magnitude of these efficiency gains. And
they suggest that the effect on market value serve as a touchstone for
evaluating the social desirability of various tactics for launching and
defending against hostile takeovers. Jensen (1984) captured this view
by stating:
Positive stock price changes indicate a rise in the profitability of the
merged companies. Furthermore, because evidence indicates it does
not come from the acquisition of market power, this increased prof-
itability must come from the company's improved productivity.
Many business leaders and some academic commentators (Drucker
1986; Lowenstein 1985; Law 1986) have dissented sharply from this
AndreiShleifer is assistant professor of finance business economics at the Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago. and a faculty research fellow at the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Lawrence H. Summers is professor of economics at
Harvard University and a research associate of the NBER.
The authors are indebted to Oliver Hart, Benjamin Hermalin, James Hines, Barry
Nalebuff, Robert W. Vishny, Oliver E. Williamson, and especially Bengt Holmstrom and
Michael C. Jensen for helpful comments, and to the Seaver Institute for financial support.
Their help does not constitute an endorsement of the views expressed in this paper.
33r
34Andrel Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 35
view, arguing that takeovers create private value by capturing rents imme
but create little or no social value. Their argument is that shareholder purch
gains come from the exploitation of financial market misvaluations, outpu
from the use of tax benefits, and from rent expropriation from workers, Platea
suppliers, and other corporate stakeholders. The dissenters suggest In
that the disruption costs of at least some hostile takeovers may well media
exceed their social benefits. workc
This chapter examines theoretically and empirically the elements of is laid
truth in the claims that improved management and redistributed wealth perce
are the sources of takeover premia. We show how hostile takeovers route
can be privately beneficial and take place even when they are not by 25
socially desirable. Our argument does not invoke tax, financial markets, In
or monopoly power considerations. porat
Instead, we start with the insight of Coase (1937) and Fama and ploye
Jensen (1983) that corporations represent a nexus of contracts, some the rn
implicit, between shareholders and stakeholders. As argued by Wil- mate
liamson (1985), many institutions are designed to minimize the prob- meroi
lems associated with opportunistic behavior where contracts are implicit. USZ
We argue that hostile takeovers facilitate opportunistic behavior at the All
expense of stakeholders. In this way hostile takeovers enable share- of the
holders to transfer wealth from stakeholders to themselves more so scena
than to create wealth. The available empirical evidence suggests that less p
the redistributions associated with takeovers can be large and that Petro
perhaps some inefficiencies result as well. It is then incorrect to gauge socie
the efficiency gains from takeovers by looking at event study measures are ai
of increases in shareholder wealth. empli
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 distinguishes be- hand
tween the value-creating and value-redistributing effects of hostile take- In Sc
overs and argues that the latter are likely to be of dominant importance. offse
The succeeding three sections treat three questions central to the ar- with
gument that takeover gains come largely from breaching implicit con- main
tracts. First, what is the value to shareholders of being able to enter happ
into implicit contracts with stakeholders? Second, how does trust sup- COflM
port these implicit contracts? Third, how can hostile takeovers breach firms
this trust and thus enable shareholders to realize the gains from default inves
on stakeholder claims? Having described the role of breach of trust Th
and wealth redistributions in hostile takeovers, we turn to a more hosti
systematic examination of their welfare properties in section 2.6. Sec- efits.
tion 2.7 then examines some empirical evidence shedding light on this the e
theory of takeovers, and section 2.8 presents our conclusions. shari
losse
is rea
2.2Value Creation and Value Redistribution the e
Consider three scenarios. In scenario A, T. Boone Pickens takes over empl
Plateau Petroleum and immediately lays off 10,000 workers, who of th35 Breach ofTrust in Hostile Takeovers
rents immediately find work elsewhere at the same wage. Pickens also stops
older purchasing from numerous suppliers, who find that they can sell their
ions output without any price reduction to other customers. The stock of
kers Plateau Petroleum rises by 25percent.
In scenario 13 Frank Lorenzo takes over Direction Airlines and im-
well mediately stares down the union so that the wages of the existing
workers are reduced by 30 percent and 10 percent of the work force
ts of laid off and unable to find subsequent employment at more than 50
ealth percent of their previous wage. Lorenzo does not change the airline's
verS route structure or flight frequency. The stock of Direction Airlines rises
not by 25percent.
kets, In scenario C Carl Icahn takes over USZ. He closes down the cor-
porate headquarters and lays off thousands of highly paid, senior em-
and ployees, who had previously been promised lifetime employment by
ome the now-displaced managers. Icahn also shuts down factories that dom-
Wil- mate the economies of several small towns. As a consequence nu-
rob- merous local stores, restaurants, and bars go bankrupt. The stock of
licit. USZ goes up by 25percent.
t the All three takeovers yield equal private benefits to the shareholders
are- of the target firms. Yet their social consequences are very different. In
e so scenario A society is better off because resources are diverted from
that less productive to more productive uses. The increased value of Plateau
that Petroleum approximately reflects the value of this gain. In Scenario B
uge society is about equally well off. The gains to Direction shareholders
ures are approximately offset by the losses to the human wealth of Direction
employees. The redistribution is probably antiegalitarian. On the other
be- hand, it may ultimately lead to advantages for customers of the airline.
In Scenario C society is worse off. The gains to USZ shareholders are
ice. offset by the losses incurred by the laid-off employees and by the firms
ar- with immobile capital whose viability depended on the factories' re-
ton- maining open. And other firms find that once their workers see what
nter happened at USZ, they become less loyal and require higher wages to
;up- compensate them for a reduction in their perceived security. These
ach firms also have a harder time inducing their suppliers to make fixed
âult investments on their behalf.
rust These three examples make it clear that increases in share values in
lore hostile takeovers in no way measure or demonstrate their social ben-
efits. Scenario A is the only one in which share price increases capture
this the elimination of waste and the gains in social welfare. In contrast,
shareholder gains in scenarios B and C to a large extent come from
losses of the value of employees' human capital. Even if some efficiency
is realized from wages' coming more into line with marginal products,
the efficiency is only a second order effect relative to the transfer from
ver employees to shareholders. Scenario C has additional external effects
of the acquisition which, while not resulting in gains to the acquirer,36Andrei Shielfer and Lawrence H. Summers 37
should enter the social calculation. The claim that the 25 percent take- 1flcre
over premium in scenarios B and C measures social gains is simply Invol
incorrect. likel
In the remainder of the chapter we develop issues raised by scenarios Th
B and C. Why are there implicit contracts it pays to breach? Why are discr
raiders willing but incumbents unwilling to breach implicit contracts? distri
What are the transfers accompanying such a breach? What are the this
social costs of the breach of implicit contracts? Before taking up these
quest.ons, however, we must stress an a priori consideration suggesting the s
that scenarios B and C have much more to do with observed takeover these
premia than does scenario A. from
Consider a rather stylized firm that has a capital stock worth $100, In
hires 14 workers at $5 a year, purchases $20 worth of materials, and takeo
has sales of $100 a year. Its profits are $10 a year and its cost of capital impac
is .10, and so its market value will be $100. The ratios of market value, twofol
earnings, and payroll are roughly accurate as representations of typical
firms in the U.S. economy. Imagine that the firm is in steady state. em. S
Suppose the firm, because of an excess of free cash flow, starts to tional
invest excessively rather than keeping its capital stock constant, to the extren
point that it invests half its profits in projects with a present value of
.5. If the market expects this practice to continue indefinitely, the firm's
value will fall by 25 percent. Eliminating this rather disastrous policy
2 3 of excessive reinvestment in terrible projects could presumably pro- 1
ducea takeover gain of about 25 percent. A co
Now suppose that the firm invests rationally but, because of agency and st
problems involving management's greater loyalty to the employees scribe,
than to the shareholders, overpays the work force by 5 percent. To put tracts
this figure in perspective, note that unions typically raise labor costs the imi
by about 15 percent and that firms in the same industry in the same tent
city typically pay wages to workers in the same detailed occupational valuabi
category that differ by 50 percent or more (Krueger and Summers 1987). therefoi
This overpayment to labor, if expected to endure, will reduce profits The
by $3.50 a year, leading to a reduction in market value of 35 percent. and stal
To the extent that the cash flows obtainable by cutting wages are safer investm
than the firm's profit stream, this figure is an underestimate. spend tj
The point of these examples is simple. Since firms' labor costs far that his
exceed their profits and since even poor capital investments yield some contract
returns, very small differences in firms' success in extracting rents if he
from workers and other corporate stakeholders are likely to be much profits o
more important in determining market value than the differences in custome
corporate waste associated with differences in firms' volume of rein- loyalty.
vestment. An intermediate case is provided by changes in the level of that the
employment. Here the reduction in payroll is likely to be offset by to descn
some loss of product, so that it is more difficult to raise value by them.37 Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
ake- increasing efficiency in this way. Moreover, some rent extraction is
iply involved since the appropriate opportunity cost for laid-off labor is
likely to be less than its wage.
These considerations suggest that takeovers that limit managerial
are discretion increase the acquired firm's market value primarily by re-
cts9 distributing wealth from corporate stakeholders to share owners. To
the this extent, the existence and magnitude of takeover premia is not
/
hese probative regarding the social costs and benefits of takeovers. Rather,
ting the social valuation of hostile takeovers must turn on the impact of
ver these redistributions on economic efficiency, which will obviously vary
from case to case.
100 In this chapter we focus on one particular efficiency aspect of hostile
ann takeovers that captures the concerns of many observers, namely, their
pital impact on the ability of firms to contract efficiently. Our motivation is
lue twofold. First, we show that the arguments of those who see hostile
,ical takeovers as destructions of valuable "corporate cultures" are coher-
ate. ent. Second, and much more tentatively, we suggest that the reputa-
to tional externalities associated with hostile takeovers may in fact have
the extremely serious allocative consequences.
e of
m's
2.3The Value of Implicit Contracts
pro-
A corporation is a nexus of long-term contracts between shareholders
and stakeholders. Because the future contingencies are hard to de-
yees scribe, complete contracting is costly. As a result, many of these con-
put tracts are implicit, and the corporation must be trusted to deliver on
osts the implicit contracts even without enforcement by courts. To the ex-
ame tent that long-term contracts reduce costs, such trustworthiness is a
onal valuable asset of the corporation. Shareholders own this asset and are
p87). therefore able to hire stakeholders using implicit long-term contracts.
ofits The principal reason why long-term contracts between shareholders
ent. and stakeholders are needed is to promote relationship-specific capital
afer investments by the stakeholders (Williamson 1985). An employee will
spend time and effort to learn how to do his job well only if he knows
far that his increased productivity will be subsequently rewarded. A sub-
ome contractor exploring for oil will buy site-specific new equipment only
ents if he believes that the contracting oil firm will not try to squeeze his
Luch profits once he sinks the cost. A sales representative will service past
s in customers only if she is assured she will continue to benefit from their
em- loyalty. In these and other cases it is important to the shareholders
of that the stakeholders do a good job, but shareholders may be unable
by to describe what specific actions this calls for, let alone to contract for
by them.
.I r
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The necessary arrangement to ensure appropriate investment by A
stakeholders is a long-term contract, which allows them to collect some malt
of the rewards of doing good work over time. The expense of writing mos
a complete contingent contract ensures that these long-term contracts Phd
are implicit. Examples of such contracts are hiring an oil exploration repi
company for the long haul, so that it acquires the equipment best suited
for the long-term customer; lifetime employment for workers who then aget
learn how to do the job efficiently; and surrender of customer lists to as ti
sales representatives who can then profit from repeated purchases verr
(Grossman and Hart 1986). futu
Even when no capital investments are required, long-term contracts imp
can be used to elicit effort (Lazear 1979) or risk sharing (Harris and prot
Holmstrom 1982) on the part of the contractor. Although these long-
term contracts are usually thought of as covering managers or em- Ti
ployees, they also commonly apply to customers and suppliers. The for
contracts are beneficial both to stakeholders and to shareholders, as trusi
they split the ex ante gains from trade. Shareholders in particular ben- Mos
efit because no easy alternative arrangements would ensure that stake- bec
holders do a good job. do s
Waj
evel 2.4The Importance of Trust
that
Although both shareholders and stakeholders benefit ex ante from Kne
implicit long-term contracts, ex post it might pay shareholders to re- belii
nege. For example, it will pay shareholders to fire old workers whose cust
wage exceeds their marginal product in a contract that, for incentive
reasons, underpaid them when they were young. Or shareholders might A
profit from getting rid of workers whom they insured against uncertain the
ability and who turned out to be inept. Or shareholders might gain from exa
refusing to compensate a supplier for investing in the buyer-specific beh
plant, after this plant is built. Or an insurance company can repossess part
its sales representative's customer list. In all these cases implicit con- sun
tracts specify actions that ex post reduce the firm's value, even though tect
agreeing to these actions is ex ante value maximizing. Breach of con- Cor
tract can therefore raise shareholder wealth, and the more so the greater on I
isthe burden of fulfilling past implicit contracts. Conversely, the value con
of workers' human capital or of suppliers' relationship-specific capital ben
stock suffers a loss, the
To take advantage of implicit contracts, shareholders must be trusted to d
by potential stakeholders. Otherwise, stakeholders would expect breach recc
whenever it raises the firm's value and would never enter into implicit exci
contracts. To convince stakeholders that implicit contracts are good, firm
shareholders must be trusted not to breach contracts even when it is the
value maximizing to do so. mar39Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
nt by A standard solution to the problem of how implicit contracts are
some maintained is the theory of rational reputation formation, described
most notably by Kreps (1984). In this theory managers adhere to im-
tracts plicit contracts because their adherence enables them to develop a
ration reputation for trustworthiness, and thus to benefit from future implicit
suited contracts. If violating an implicit contract today would make the man-
) then agers untrustworthy in the future, they will uphold the contract as long
to as the option of entering into future contracts is valuable enough. Con-
hases versely, if it is not important for the managers to be trusted in the
future, that is, if a reputation is not valuable, they will violate the
tracts implicit contract. Formally, a rational reputation is modeled as a small
s and probability that the manager is irrationally honest, sustained by honest
long- behavior on the part of the manager.
r em- The position that the sole reason to trust a manager (or anyone else
The for that matter) is his reputation is not plausible. People commonly
rs, as trust other people even when no long-term reputations are at stake.
ben- Most people do not steal not only because they fear punishment, but
take- because they are simply honest. Those who leave their cars unlocked
do so relying more on other people's integrity than on police powers.
Waiters rely on their expectation that most people tip in restaurants
even when they expect never to come back. In fact, evidence shows
that travellers' tips are no smaller than those of patrons (Kahneman,
from Knetch, and Thaler 1986). Even more striking is the fact that people
to re- believe a garage mechanic is as likely to cheat a tourist as a regular
'hose customer, thus defying the importance of reputation (Kahneman,
ntive Knetch, and Thaler 1986).
might As do the rest of us, managers often fail to take advantage of others
rtain they deal with simply because it would violate an implicit trust. One
from example in which such trust appears to us more germane to managerial
ecific behavior than pursuit of a rational reputation is pensions. First, a large
ssess part of the retirees' benefits often takes the form of medical and in-
con- surance benefits that are not explicitly contracted for and are not pro-
Lough tected by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA;
con- Congressional Information Service 1985). Pensioners obviously count
eater on the employer to provide them with these benefits without explicit
value contracts. In the case of pension benefits themselves, most defined
tpital benefit pension plans raised the payments to their beneficiaries after
the inflation of the late 1970s even though they were not under contract
jsted to do so (Allen, Clark, and Sumner 1984).2 Moreover, the stock market
reach recognizes that such increases are forthcoming and does not regard
plicit excess pension fund assets to be the property of shareholders. When
ood, firms remove excess assets from their pension funds, the market greets
it is the news with a share price increase (Alderson and Chen 1986). The
market expects that managers do what employees trust them to do.40Andrel Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 41B
To dispel the fear of breach on the part of stakeholders, shareholders to shoy
find it value maximizing to seekoutor train individuals who are capable other ç
of commitment to stakeholders, elevate them to management, and en- stakeb
trench them. To such managers, stakeholder claims, once agreed to,
are prior to shareholder claims. Even when a rational reputation is not per se
of high enough value to shareholders to uphold the implicit contracts On the
with stakeholders, as would be the case if the company suffered a large costly
permanent decline in demand, trustworthy managers will still respect CEOS
• stakeholder claims. From the ex ante viewpoint, such dedication to condu
stakeholders might be a value-maximizing managerial attribute(not
• choice!). In a world without takeovers, potential stakeholders counting
on such managers to respect their claims will enter into contracts with
the firm. 2.51
How, then, can shareholders appoint as managers individuals whom In s
stakeholders can trust? It is probably most likely that prospective man- holdej
agers are trained or brought up to be committed to stakeholders. In a are nc
family enterprise, for example, offspring could be raised to believe in cases
the company's paternalism toward all the parties involved in its op- the bi
eration. Alternatively, a person who spends 20 or 30 years with a As th
company before becoming a CEO will have spent all that time being rever
helped by the stakeholders in his ascent, and he therefore becomes contr
committed to them. These are examples in which managers pass through tracts
a "loyalty filter," using Akerlof's (1983) phrase, before reaching the gains
top. Having done so, they find stakeholder welfare has now entered share
their preferences, thus making them credible upholders of implicit con- Ma
tracts.3 Whatever the exact mechanism, it is essential to see that share- cede
holders deliberately choose as managers individuals for whom value holde
maximization is subordinate to satisfaction of stakeholder claims, and reali2
then surrender to them control over the firm's contracts. weali
This characterization of managers has an interesting connection with Tb
Kreps's (1984) theory of rational reputation. In that theory the world is not ii
inhabited by a minor fraction of randomly located trustworthy individ- moti
uals, and stakeholders start out with the view that there is a small chance take
that the manager of the firm is of this irrational type. This small chance is rn
nonetheless suffices to entice the stakeholders to enter into the implicit targe
contract. By mimicking the behavior of the irrationally trustworthy in- from
dividual, the rational manager maintains the stakeholders' anticipation in
that he might be trustworthy, thereby ensuring their agreement to the a rai
implicit contract. In contrast to this theory our argument says that share- track
holders actually locate (or train) the truly trustworthy people and install
them as managers because it is ex ante value maximizing to do so. stak4
It is natural to ask why shareholders appoint these truly trustworthy acqu
people, rather than the deceptive ones who just pretend to be trust- exte
worthy (as in Kreps 1984), but then maximize value when push comes41 Breachof Trust inHostile Takeovers
rs to shove. The primary answer is that trustworthiness is correlated with
)le other personal characteristics and actions, ones that shareholders and
stakeholders can learn about. With the wealth of information at hand,
:0, genuinely trustworthy people can be selected. Managers who are trusted
ot per se can enter into more efficient contracts than those who must rely
ts on their reputation. Alternatively, Akerlof (1983) argues that it is so
ge costly to learn to be deceptive that one might as well not be. Lastly,
ct CEOs by the time they come to power have a long public record of
to conduct vis-à-vis commitments. There are no lifetime moles.
ot
ng
th 2.5Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
rn In some circumstances upholding the implicit contracts with stake-
holders becomes a liability to shareholders. The incumbent managers
a are nonetheless committed to upholding stakeholder claims. In these
in cases ousting the managers is a prerequisite to realizing the gains from
p- the breach. This is precisely what hostile takeovers can accomplish.
a As the incumbent managers are removed after the takeover, control
ng reverts to the bidder, who is not committed to upholding the implicit
es contracts with stakeholders. Shareholders can then renege on the con-
gh tracts and expropriate rents from the stakeholders. The resulting wealth
he gains show up as the takeover premia. Hostile takeovers thus enable
ed shareholders to redistribute wealth from stakeholders to themselves.
fl- Managerscommitted to upholding stakeholder claims will not con-
cede to the redistribution. They will resist it, even though the share-
ue holders at this point will withdraw their support from the managers to
realize the ex post gain.4 Not surprisingly, then, takeovers that transfer
wealth from stakeholders to shareholders must be hostile.
The importance of transfers in justifying the takeover premium does
is not imply that breach of implicit contracts is always the actual takeover
id- motive. Breach can be the motive, as for example is the case in some
cc takeovers explicitly aiming to cut wages. At other times the acquisition
cc is motivated by the overinvestment or other free cash flows of the
Cit targeted firm. Even in these takeovers much of the gain must come
fl- from reducing the wealth of stakeholders, who did not count on changes
Ofl in operations when agreeing to work for the firm. Take, for example,
he a railroad whose management invests in upgrading and extending the
e- tracks when this investment has a negative net present value. The
all management's goal is to provide jobs for railroad employees and other
stakeholders who count on continuation of the business. When a hostile
by acquisitor cuts off these investments, the shareholders gain. To a large
St extent, however, the gains come at the expense of the employees'
es employment and wage losses.42Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers
For breachtobe an important source of gains, hostile takeovers must
come as a surprise to stakeholders, who entered into implicit contracts
expecting the firm to be run by trustworthy managers. For if the stake-
holders anticipate a hostile takeover, they will realize the trustworthi-
ness of the incumbent managers is worthless, since they will be duly
removed when shareholder interest so demands. Implicit contracts based
on trust are feasible only insofar as the managers upholding them are
entrenched enough to retain their jobs in the face of a hostile threat.
The elements of the story now fall into place. In a world without
takeovers, shareholders hire or train trustworthy managers, who on
their behalf enter into implicit contracts with the stakeholders. Sub-
sequently, some or many of these contracts become a liability to share-
holders, who cannot default on them without replacing the incumbent
managers. Managers are hard to replace internally because to a large
extent they control the board of directors, their own compensation
scheme, and the proxy voting mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny 1988b).
This failure of internal controls may in fact be in shareholders' ex ante
interest, since it may be the only way to assure commitment by share-
holders to stakeholders in the absence of takeovers.
Hostile takeovers are external means of removing managers who
uphold stakeholder claims. Takeovers then allow shareholders to ap-
propriate stakeholders' cx post rents in the implicit contracts. The gains
are split between the shareholders of the acquired and the acquiring
firms. At least in part, therefore, the gains are wealth redistributing












































As described in section 2.2, contract breach accompanying takeovers
allows for a redistribution of rents from stakeholders to shareholders.
To some extent takeovers in this case are rent-seeking and not value-
creating exercises, with investment bankers' fees and management time
representing wasted resources. If this is the scenario capturing reality,
then shareholder wealth gains in takeovers are not an appropriate mea-
sure of value gains. Even if the combined value of the acquired and
the acquiring firms rises as a result of a merger, at least part of value
increase is offset by stakeholder wealth losses.
Thus, even if there are some efficiency gains from a takeover, they
may pale by comparison with the transfers of wealth. Consider the
case of disciplinary takeovers, in which target managers who are failing
to run their firm to maximize its value are forcibly removed. Following
an acquisition of this type, the buyer usually cuts wages, lays off many
employees, raises leverage, eliminates executive perquisites, and in
IL43 Breachof Trust in HostileTakeovers
ust general significantly tightens operations. Because these changes in-
cts crease profitability, hostile takeovers designed to eliminate a firm's free
ke- cash flows are taken as paradigmatic cases of efficiency-improving
hi- transactions.
uly Although there probably are some efficiency gains in such takeovers,
sed it is also the case that employees and suppliers lose a great deal of
are their previous rents with the firm. Much of the shareholder gains in
this case are stakeholder losses. The argument is similar to that for
out eliminating monopoly in a market. Although there is an efficiency gain
on equal to the Harberger triangle, by far the biggest impact of going from
ub- monopolyto competition is a transfer of rents from profit owners to
consumers. Just as it is inappropriate to measure the efficiency gains
ent from eliminating monopoly by the trapezoid under the demand curve,
rge it is incorrect to measure efficiency gains from removing incompetent
ion managers by shareholder wealth gains. And just as it would be map-
b). propriate to gauge the benefit of banning monopoly by the willingness
nte of consumers to pay for the ban, it is wrong to measure efficiency gains
re- from takeovers by share price increases on the announcement of the
deal.
'ho In some disciplinary takeovers the transfers from stakeholders can
ap- also lead to significant welfare losses that mediate against welfare gains.
ins As we show below, the transfers can lead to ex post inefficient resource
'ing allocation if efficient contracting is impaired in the postbreach envi-
ing ronment. In addition, by limiting the scope for contracting, takeovers
can reduce ex ante welfare.
2.6.1Ex Post Efficiency
So far we have shown only that the transfer component of a share-
ers holder wealth increase should not be counted as value creating (sce-
rs. nario B) and that such transfers can be large relative to the total
IC- shareholder gain. Breach can in addition entail efficiency losses. In
me some cases, when the acquirer and the stakeholders renegotiate after
Sty, the breach, they are unable to do so efficiently. As the following ex-
ea- amples show, the magnitude of the efficiency losses depends on whether
nd the conditions needed for the Coase theorem to hold obtain in the
tue postbreach environment. If they do hold, breach is just a transfer; if
they do not, it entails some ex post inefficiencies.
iey Consider, first, an example of asymmetric information between the
the buyer and the employees of the acquired firm. To be specific, suppose
ing Carl Icahn takes over Trans World Airlines and breaches the agreement
ing that its flight attendants be paid $15 per hour. Let the marginal product
my of these experienced flight attendants, who have made an investment
in in their TWA jobs, be $10, but let this be known to Icahn only. Let44Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers
these flight attendants' opportunity wage at the outside be $5,which
is also the cost and the marginal product of their replacements at TWA. 2.
As long as Icahn pays the existing flight attendants below $10, he can
make money. Unfortunately, the flight attendants do not know that
their productivity is $10, and they might insist on a higher wage. If no
agreement is reached in this situation of asymmetric information, the tl
flight attendants quit and go to work elsewhere at $5,andgains from
trade are not realized.
Note that the Icahn takeover has two implications. First, sharehold-
ers regain the extra $5theywere overpaying flight attendants under
the old regime, which is just a transfer. Second, however, because of in
asymmetric information in the ex post contracting environment, the
takeover entailed a misallocation of resources as the TWA-specific 01
capital of flight attendants went to waste. The second problem is not w
unique to takeovers; it occurs in many environments with asymmetric
information. But takeovers can exacerbate this inefficiency by moving Vi
negotiations into the environment of less trust and greater informational th
asymmetries, in
The second reason for the failure of the Coase theorem that can lead fl(
to the inefficiency in the ex post contracting environment is the free b3
rider problem. Suppose that in Bartersville, Oklahoma, the residents if
earn some rents from the presence of Phillips Petroleum in their town, op
perhaps because it distributes charity there or indirectly subsidizes
some businesses. If Boone Pickens takes Phillips over, he will recapture Wi
those rents, perhaps by moving out. It is possible that Bartersville
residents would choose to pay him to stay, but doing so would require of
a collective action they might not be able to mount. This again leads pa
to an ex post efficiency loss in addition to a transfer from Bartersville
residents—who are Phillips stakeholders—to the shareholders. he
Both of these examples are manifestations of ex post inefficiencies
accompanying takeovers. The source of these inefficiencies is the fail-
ure of the Coase theorem in the ex post environment, that is, gains plc
from trade are not realized. Although takeovers are not responsible for qu
this failure of the Coase theorem, they are responsible for creating the to
environment in which it is likely to fail. nai
The implications of these welfare losses for share price behavior are coi
ambiguous, since the price depends on how much is lost by share- his
holders and how much by stakeholders. What is unambiguous, how- be
ever, is that, in general, these welfare losses will not be taken into to
account by looking at the change in value of the acquirer and the target. pai'
We already see, therefore, two sources of miscalculation: Transfers fire
from stakeholders cannot be counted as value creating; and the corn- anc
bined value changes do not reflect the part of efficiency losses not 1
borne by shareholders. of45 Breachof Trust in HostileTakeovers
2.6.2Ex Ante Efficiency
can The discussionhas so far beenconcerned solely with the cx post
hat consequences of unanticipated takeovers. To this end, we assumed that
no peoplecontracted as if takeovers never took place, and then we traced
the the distributional and efficiency consequences of breach. In fact, it
om seems quite plausible that hostile takeovers and the attendant oppor-
tunities for breach of implicit contracts came as a surprise to many
)ld- U.S. workers and managers.
der Although the cx post analysis is the one that sheds light on the
interpretation of event studies, it leaves open the question of contract-
the ing in the environment where takeovers do occur. This is the question
ific of the cx ante welfare implications of breach of trust through takeovers,
not which we take up next.
tric If potential stakeholders believe that their contracts will surely be
ing violated whenever they coilect more from the firm than they put in,
nal they will not agree to implicit contracts. Potential suppliers will not
invest in relationship-specific capital, the young will shirk if they expect
cad rio raise in the future, and firms will be unable to reduce labor costs
by offering insurance against uncertain ability to their workers. Even
nts if breach via takeover is not a certainty but only a possibility, the
opportunities for long-term contracting will be limited. To the extent
zes that realizing gains from trade requires such contracting, these gains
ure will remain unrealized and ex ante welfare will be reduced.
ilk A common example of a postacquisition change is the consolidation
lire of headquarters, which usually results in dismissal of a number of highly
ads paid employees of the acquired firm. This change can be viewed as a
ille reduction in the acquired firm's corporate slack, since large corporate
headquarters represent on-the-job consumption of top executives. But
:ies the closing of headquarters can also be viewed as a breach of contract
au- with the long-term employees who work there, even when those em-
ins ployees do not produce much. An idle employee at corporate head-
for quarters could be there to get his career-endreward for previous service
the to the company or his consolation payment for having lost the tour-
nament for the top job. In either case the employee is costing the
are company more than he is contributing at the moment, and therefore
re- his dismissal is a gain to the shareholders. It nonetheless might have
been in the shareholders' interest to use an implicit long-term contract
nto to attract this employee cx ante and to entice him to work hard or to
let. participate in the tournament. In line with this interpretation, those
èrs fired after an acquisition often talk about broken promises (Owen 1986)
and claim they will never again trust a large corporation.
not These considerations raise the important issue of the scope of fear
of breach. That is, if some firms are taken over, how severely will this46Andrei Shielfer and Lawrence H. Summers 47
limit contracting opportunities at other firms? The spread of fear that
implicit contracts are worthless is an example of reputational exter- 2.7,1
nalities (Zeckhauser 1986) in that it concerns the extent to which events In
in some firms affect expectations in others. The larger the fear of sistet
takeovers spreading through the economy, the more severe are the alenc
limitations on contracting, and the larger is the welfare loss.
As we said at the start of this section, the ability to enter into implicit Ou
contracts and to be trusted to abide by them may be one of the most of st
valuable assets owned by shareholders. Takeovers may substantially exph
reduce the value of these assets. In the popular literature this phenom- share
enon has been called the decline of corporate loyalty, which is widely ket f
cited as a cost to firms. This cost can show up in explicit costly contracts such
with stakeholders (such as labor protection provisions, or LPPs), or in the
the need to pay them more now in return for their accepting uncertainty
about future payments, or simply as forgone profitable trade. Whatever elirni
form this cost takes, it should ultimately show in the declining value trans
of corporate equity. case
In summary, this section attempted to describe how shareholders the c
can benefit in takeovers by defaulting on their implicit obligations to be ig
the stakeholders. In the situation of incomplete contracts or incomplete
markets, it is incorrect to equate changes in shareholder wealth with they
value created in takeovers. Even taking ex post efficiency as the welfare of go
index, a change in shareholders' wealth includes redistributions from selve
stakeholders and ignores efficiency losses that are not paid for by the Pa
shareholders. Looking at shareholder wealth also completely ignores stoo
the ex ante welfare costs of ex post opportunism, which could be very cost
large.5
whei
weal 2.7Empirical Evidence nece
In evaluating the importance of transfers from stakeholders to share- empi
holders, we always compare them to efficiency gains, whose signifi- nari
cance has been emphasized in much of the literature (for example, Oi
Jensen and Ruback 1983). We proceed in four steps. First, we show
that the presence of large redistributions is consistent with established of h
statistical generalizations about takeovers. Second, we study a special It is
case—Carl Icahn's takeover of TWA—to determine how much of the runn
takeover premium can be accounted for by the expropriation of rents (TW
from corporate stakeholders. Third, we look at the effects of a takeover corn
of Youngstown Sheet and Tube on the welfare of stakeholders whose valu
losses were not captured by the shareholders, namely, the members of scril
the local community. Last, we present some anecdotal evidence on the indu




nts In this section we note that the stylized facts of takeovers are con-
of sistentboth withthe prevalence of efficiency gains and with the prey-
the alertceof transfers of wealth. In reviewing the evidence, we returnto
calling the first case scenario A and the second scenario B or C.
icit Our theory clearly explains the takeover premia since some portion
iost of stakeholder wealth is transferred to shareholders. More subtly, it
illy explains why most of the wealth gains accrue to the acquired firm's
shareholders. If it takes little skill to break implicit contracts, the mar-
ely ket for corporate control is essentially a common values auction. In
cts such a competitive auction all the gains accrue to the seller, namely,
in the target's shareholders.
nty Managers would resist takeovers both if the gains come purely from
ver eliminating their incompetence, as in scenario A, and if they come from
lue transfers from stakeholders, as in scenarios B and C. In the former
case poor managers are reluctant to be exposed and lose control. In
ers the case of breach managers are reluctant to let stakeholders' claims
to be ignored. This is confirmed especially by the common incidence of
managers negotiating severance provisions for employees even after
ith they know that the takeover will occur (Commons 1985). The existence
Lre of golden parachutes suggests that the managers do not forget them-
selves, as stakeholders, either.
he Patterns of reorganization following a takeover can also be under-
stood using either scenario A or scenarios B and C. Either efficient
ry cost cutting or breach can justify employee dismissals, plant closings,
project curtailment, divestments, and subcontractor removals. To see
whether the parties that lose association with the acquired firm suffer
wealth losses, one must trace their subsequent employment. This is
necessary, but not sufficient, to establish breach, and it is hard to do
re- empirically. Otherwise such separations could be efficient, as in sce-
ifi- nario A (Jensen 1984).
le, One striking fact militating in favor of. the importance of wealth
transfers as opposed to pure efficiency gains is that a significant fraction
ed of hostile acquisitions are initiated and executed by only a few raiders.
jal It is hard to believe that Carl Icahn has a comparative advantage in
running simultaneously a railcar leasing company (ACF), an airline
ts (TWA)anda textile mill (Dan River). It is more plausible that his
er comparative advantage is tough bargaining and a willingness to transfer
se value away from those who expect to have it. In fact, those who de-
of scribe him (including he himself) point to this as his special skill. The
industrial diversity of many raiders' holdings suggests that their par-
ticular skill is value redistribution rather than value creation.6 It is not48Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 4
at all surprising, in this context, that many of these raiders have hardly c
any employees of their own. b
It is important to emphasize at this point that our discussion of
efficiency gains and of transfers concerns hostiletakeovers.As stressed si
by Shleifer, and Vishny in this volume, these are disciplinary
acquisitions designed to change the operations of the firm. They should
be contrasted with synergistic acquisitions, which are usually friendly m
and motivated by market power, diversification, or tax considerations. w
Shleifer, and Vishny show that the two types of deals are
targeted at very different companies and hence should not be treated m
as examples of the same economic process. ai
The study by Brown and Medoff in this volume reveals how impor. co
tant this distinction can be. The authors look at a sample of several va
hundred acquisitions of small Michigan companies and find that em- m
ployment and wages rise after the sale of a firm. Because the companies ho
in their sample are so small, it seems plain that the sample is one of $1
friendly mergers, ones that presumably serve as a means of expansion ov
by the buyer. In fact, we doubt that they have any hostile deals in their rai
sample at all. Our arguments for breach do not then apply to their wii
resultsand vice versa. In this and other instances it would be a serious "1
conceptualmistake to use the data on friendly acquisitions to interpret
theories of hostile takeovers, an
A significant problem for virtually any theory of hostile takeovers pn
that we know is posed by acquisitions by "white knights." These are tic
companies that top the hostile offer and merge with the target in a Bc
friendly combination, often retaining the management. How can white soi
knights pay more and at the same time forgo management improvement of
or contract breach? We suspect that white knights are not as friendly wo
as they appear. For example, after a "friendly" rescue of CBS by I
Lawrence Tisch (who did not even buy the company to gain control), of
he dismissed hundreds of employees, sold several divisions, and in- thi:
stituted many cost-containment reforms. Even white knights have a mit
shade of grey. ma
cut
2.7.2CaseStudy: Carl Icahn and TWA
Carl lcahn's takeover of TWA in 1985 has attracted enough attention
and commentary to provide us with sufficient data to assess stakeholder by
losses. In particular, Icahn's gain of control was accompanied by changes trar
in compensation for members of the three major unions at TWA. By
looking at changes in the wages and benefits of TWA's workers, we wag
can gauge stakeholder losses. At the same time, we acknowledge from repi
the start that the case of TWA does not strictly fit our model. Wages
for union members at TWA were determined under governmental reg- Sinc
ulation. The pre-Icahn management had not been successful (or cost•1
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ly competent) in renegotiating wages; for a variety of reasons TWA had
bad labor relations. It is, therefore, not the case that TWA management
of resisted the acquisition to avoid a breach of contract. All the evidence
suggests that the managers wanted to keep their jobs and resisted
acquisition for that reason. Nonetheless, the main observation of this
id paper—that takeover premia are often paid for by stakeholders—is
ly much more general than the particular model of managerial behavior
we develop.
re Before Icahn began investing in TWA on the open market, its 33
million shares traded at $8. Icahn eventually bought 40 percent of the
airline through open market purchases and the rest through a (hotly
r- contested) tender offer. Although his cost per share on the open market
al varied from $8 to $24, the offer was completed at $24 per share. At
most, then, Icahn's premium was $500 million. There is evidence,
es however, that he bought 20 percent of the stock at an average price of
'of $12 and another 20 percent at the average price of $16 to $18. Icahn's
)fl overall average price therefore was $20, putting the premium in the
range between $300 million and $400 million. This figure is consistent
with estimates made in the popular press (Fortune, Business Week,
us "Takeover").
et TWA's three major unions represented its pilots, flight attendants,
and machinists. Contracts signed between the pilots and Icahn basically
rs prohibited significant trimming down of TWA operations and, in par-
re ticular, pilot layoffs or significant airplane sales. In fact, leases on three
a Boeing 747s were not renewed, and one was sold. There were also
'te some, though not major, layoffs at TWA's St. Louis headquarters. Most
nt of the action by far came from wage reductions for the "production"
ly workers, calculated below.
Before Icahn took control TWA paid its 3,000 pilots an average salary
I), of $90,000 per year, including benefits. The agreement with Icahn cut
this around 30 percent, for an annual savings of approximately $100
a million (Fortune, "Takeover"). The company employed about 9,000
machinists at an average cost of $38,000. They agreed to a 15 percent
cut, saving TWA around $50 million per year. The story with flight
attendants is more complicated, since no agreement was reached. On
average, a TWA flight attendant made $35,000 a year. Some of the
on attendants (around 2,500 out of 6,000 within 3 months) were replaced
er by rookies paid an average of $18,000 per year. This is essentially a
es transfer of wealth from the existing flight attendants, who could pre-
3y sumably take entry-level jobs, to Icahn. In fact, some of them accepted
ye wage cuts, and it appears that, over time, most who did not were
replaced. Assuming conservatively that the average saving was $10,000
:es per flight attendant, the total annual saving adds up to $60 million.
Since TWA's operating losses assured it a tax free status, these labor
cost savings should be counted before tax.
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This brief analysis indicates that the average annual transfer from em
TWA's unionized employees amounted to at least $200 million under
Icahn.7 Since TWA was a very risky investment (and Icahn was not tiei
diversified), the appropriate discount rate for these savings could be YS
as high as 25 percent. This yields a present value for the transfer of cie
$800 million. In return for these wage concessions, employees received 1,9
a profit share and an ownership stake in TWA, which together amounted are
to about one-third of the company. Immediately after the takeover, bw
market value of these shares was under $200 million, which reduces wh
the value of the transfer from unions to $600 million. By these very an(
conservative estimates, then, the transfer from members of the three con
unions to Icahn amounted to one and a half times the takeover premium. E
It is hard to gauge the efficiency consequences of Icahn's acquisition. Yoi
There appears to be a consensus that the previous TWA management
was awful. If the airline went bankrupt, some of the valuable assets of and
TWA (such as its name and goodwill) might have lost value, which is of u
a social cost. Moreover, TWA can probably make better investment
decisions now than in the past, since its labor costs more accurately sal(
reflect shadow prices. On the other hand, some inefficiencies might $37
have resulted from the replacement of well-trained flight attendants by
rookies. In addition, large time costs of Icahn and others as well as
large transaction costs were incurred. Overall, we suspect efficiency dec
has been gained. This is not the main point, though. The point is that the:
at least one and a half times the premium can be explained by transfers, per
which in this case were an explicit part of the justification for the
acquisition. Shareholders gained primarily because stakeholders lost. It s
whi
2.7.3Case Study: Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Not all of the stakeholder losses in hostile takeovers are gains to the
shareholders. Losses in stakeholder wealth can also lead to numerous the
externalities and losses by third parties that are not captured by share-
holders. Consider, for example, a company town in which spending by the
the employees of the company is a large source of demand in local whi
stores. Those stores might simply be unable to cover their fixed costs it
if employees of the company are laid off and dramatically reduce their the
spending. The specific investments these merchants have made in their thel
businesses yield no payoff in this case, and as a result potentially loss
productive capital becomes worthless. This is a case of a social loss men
and not of a redistribution, since merchants' losses are not captured socii
by shareholders.
An example of community distress following a takeover is the case
of the acquisition of Youngstown Sheet and Tube (YST) by Lykes 2.7.
Steamship Company in 1970, and the subsequent acquisition of the W
latter by LIV Steel in 1979. Between 1977 and 1979 over 6,000 YST for t51Breachof Trustin Hostile Takeovers
rn employees were layed off. One result of those layoffs, reported by the
er Youngstown Area Chamber of Commerce (1983), has been a second
01 tier increase in unemployment from businesses' losing their sales to
be YST employees. Perhaps even more telling are statistics on bankrupt-
of cies in Youngstown, which rose from 769 in 1977 to 1,000 in 1979 and
ed 1,948 in 198!. Although YST was only one of two or three Youngstown
area steel mills laying off employees, the effect of the layoffs on other
businesses in the area has been large and protracted. Interestingly,
when by 1982 other firms had begun moving into the Youngstown area
ry and hiring the unemployed local labor, they did so at much lower wages,
ee contrary to scenario A (Youngstown Area Chamber of Commerce 1983).
Perhaps the most telling evidence on the social loss borne by the
n. Youngstown community after the layoffs at YST and other steel mills
nt comes from sale prices of used homes (U.S. Department of Housing
of and Urban Development 1968—85). Between 1968 and 1980 sale prices
is of used homes in the Youngstown-Warren area rose at roughly the same
nt rate as those in the rest of Ohio and the nation. In 1980 the median
ly sale price of a used home was $43,324 in the United States as a whole,
ht $37,604 in Ohio, and $32,400 in the Youngstown-Warren area. In 1981
when the effects of the layoffs really hit Youngstown, the median sale
as price of a used home rose slightly in the United States to $45,676,
cy declined somewhat to $35,168 in Ohio, and plummeted to $25,000 in
at the Youngstown-Warren area. The last number reflects a decline of 23
percent in a single year! Arguably, that decline might reflect compo-
he sition effects if the selling steelworkers owned less than average houses.
t. It should also be counterbalanced by house price increases in areas to
which the departing Youngstown residents might move and buy houses.
With these caveats in mind, we note that the Youngstown-Warren
area had 148,000 single-family housing units at that time, and hence if
to the median sold house is representative of the housing stock as a whole,
us the housing stock could have declined in value by over $1 billion. These
wealth losses are not transfers to shareholders and therefore, modulo
the above caveats, represent the social costs of the layoffs, some of
al which resulted from the takeover.
ts It is quite possible that, from the point of view of steel production,
the takeovers have increased the efficiency of YST operations. Never-
theless, it is obvious that the YST employees suffered substantial wealth
ly losses, as. in scenario B. Furthermore, the losses of wealth of other
ss members of Youngstown community should also be counted in any
ed social appraisal of the deals.
se
es 2.7.4Reactions to Takeovers
he We do not have information to verify the predictions of our theory
for the ability of firms to contract ex ante. For to do this, we must52Andrei Shteifer and Lawrence H. Summers 53
analyze a world in which people trust each other less, workers are not
loyal to firms, and spot market transitions are more common than they
are at this time. (One can try to think of other cultures, although the
comparisons are in many ways suspect. Banfield and Banfield (1958)
described a village in southern Italy where trust was absent, hardly
any trade took place, especially intertemporally, and people voted for
whichever party bribed them most and last, which led to alternating
elections of communists and fascists. Nor surprisingly, the village was
very poor.) We offer instead a brief survey of opinions expressed by
employees of Trans Union Corporation subsequent to its merger with
Pntzkers' Marmon group. The comments we present below are based
on William M. Owen's privately printed Autopsy of a Merger, whose
title assures us of the book's impartiality.
Many of the former employees of Trans Union complained that the
company violated an implicit understanding that adequate job perfor-
mance guaranteed continued employment. The virtually universal les-
son that interviewees claimed to have learned from their takeover
experience was never again to trust a large corporation. One employee
remarked that previously he had believed that if he did a good job, he
would be appreciated. Now he thinks, "You have to look out for your-
self. You really can't hold any loyalty to a corporation." Another of-
fered his view of long.term contracts: "To the average Joe, life in the
business world can be compared to walking a tightrope across the Red
Sea. It might break at any time, so don't get too comfortable." Many
said their loyalty had been killed, and that they developed a more
cynical and cautious view of corporate America. As a result, some
reversed their prior belief that continued loyalty to a corporation would
be rewarded.
What are the tangible results of this change of attitude? In the earlier
discussion we suggested that contracting can eventually become more
costly and that, in some cases, inferior outcomes can result. There is
a bit of quotable evidence on each of these two points. One ex-employee
of Trans Union was looking "for an employer where I can participate
in ownership." Evidently, she sought equity because "employees got
nothing out of the merger," and she wanted her contract to be explicit.
Other people denied the feasibility of an employment relationship. Of
the many who sought self-employment, one thought he could no longer
have a sense of security without his own business. Less dramatically,
another asked, "How can you go to another company now and give
100 percent of your effort?" While it is premature to interpret these
comments as foreshadowing the decline of the corporation, they do
suggest a fairly pervasive skepticism about what in the United States
is the most common form of the employment contract.
To acknowledge the merits of the alternative hypothesis, we also
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not by Jensen: "I think Trans Union was fat, dumb and happy and deserved
iey to be acquired."
he
58) 2.8Concluding Comments
for In this chapter we have stressed the role played by transfers of wealth
ng in hostile takeovers. Breach of trust through corporate takeover enables
'as shareholders to capture the ex post rents from contracts with stake-
by holders, such as suppliers and employees. Two points made in the
ith foregoing analysis should be sharply distinguished.
ed First, transfers from stakeholders to shareholders could make for a
se large part of the takeover premium. Although redistributions from the
parties to implicit contracts are important, other transfers are also
:he potentially significant. Tax savings that accompany some takeovers can
or- be viewed as redistributions from the government. At least for some
Cs- transactions, such as leveraged buyouts, tax savings can account for
er up to 80 percent of the takeover premium (Kaplan 1987; also Shielfer
ee and Vishny l988a). If takeovers are motivated by stock market un-
he dervaluations of assets, these transactions are rent redistributions from
the old shareholders to the buyer. Although evidence of the importance
of- of such undervaluations is lacking, arguments that they are important
he are not (Drucker 1986). If, as appears to be the case, rent transfers
ed form a significant part of the takeover gains, the combined share price
ny change of the target and the buyer vastly overstates the efficiency gains
re from takeovers.
ne It is also argued above, though with much less empirical support,
ild that rent-seeking takeovers may entail large efficiency losses in the
long run. The breach of trust accompanying such deals might spread
ier enough fear of further breach through the economy to either vastly
re complicate or even prevent profitable trade. Managers worried that
is their stakeholders' claims will not be respected engage in defensive
ee tactics such as restructurings or leveraged buyouts, which themselves
take away from the stakeholders. This reorganization of the corporation
;ot into more of a spot market system can be socially very costly. To gauge
it. this cost, however, would require an understanding of how trust fa-
Of cilitates contracting, which at this moment we do not have.
;er Previous academic work has tended to maintain that hostile take-
ly, overs are accompanied by increases in efficiency, but it has rarely been
ye successfulin isolating the sources of such gains. Undoubtedly, effi-
se ciency gains might justify a large part of the takeover premium in some
do takeovers, such as those in the oil industry. Redistributions, in contrast,
:es seem extremely important in the case of airlines. Unfortunately, to
evaluate which of the two sources of gains is the more important, one
so needs to look at stakeholder losses, which are much harder to measure
than shareholder gains.54Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers
One promising strategy for testing the role of wealth transfers is to Allen
look at cancellation of overfunded defined benefit pension plans, where
horror stones abound. We have already mentioned that many benefits
that retirees receive are not part of the formal pension contract pro- Hanf
tected by ERISA, and that even the actual pension benefits are to a so
large extent set by the company without compulsion. Looking at pen- Bed





1. Shareholders' ownership of relationship-specific assets could promote Farn
efficient investment ip these assets to some extent. If ownership entitles share- Jo holders to residual rights of control of relationship-specific assets, then in some Gro
cases where the contract is silent the right thing will be done (Grossman and A
Hart 1986). But limits of shareholder knowledge and limits of the firm bound (A the applicability of ownership. Han
2. This of course could be part of managers' trying to maintain a rational E
reputation for being "nice guys." Jens 3. In a similar vein we can say that managers become "addicted" to stake- (I
holders who form such an important part of their life (in contrast to constantly Jens changing shareholders). For an illuminating discussion of how such addiction
could be rational, see Becker and Murphy (forthcoming). Johi
4. The reason for this is that shareholders are anonymous, and even if they Kat
were not, the free rider problem absolves individual shareholders from collec-
tive responsibility for the breach. 7:
5. Arrow (1974) stressed the role of trust in the successful functioning of a Ka:
market economy.
6. The most famous undiversified raider is T. Boone Pickens, who specializes Kre
in prompting hostile acquisitions of oil companies. It is interesting that the case
for efficiency gains in takeovers is probably the most compelling in the oil Kn
industry, where an acquisition is often accompanied by cancellation of a waste- e
ful exploration program. La'
7. Some estimates in newspapers of total cost decreases after Icahn's ac- R
quisition give $600 million, a figure we cannot explain. In part, this includes La:
an annual saving of $100 million from lower fuel costs and probably $50 million Ii
from eliminating four 747s. The point is that $200 million is a very conservative Lo
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speci Shleifer and Summers's general point—that changes in the combined howe market value of stock of an acquired and an acquiring firm can be a
biased measure of the efficiency of a takeover—is certainly a valid and
estinl valuable one. A major restructuring of the corporation will inevitably whic
imply transfers of wealth between shareholders and stakeholders, and
takec these transfers should obviously be accounted for in assessing effi-
Th
ciency. The authors seem furthermore convinced that changes in stock up to
market value often exaggerate the true benefits from takeovers, because incul stakeholders will lose some of their rents in the process. In principle circu (and not implausibly), the bias could go the other way. Stakeholders
could benefit from a takeover by capturing some of the efficiency gains.
clam For instance, wages could rise or jobs (with attached rents) could be then saved in a takeover that improves the operation of the firm. Or the choi raider could gain privately by transferring some of the benefits to a auth
company of his that is not directly involved with the merger. In either wou case these gains would not show up in a market value calculation. look
Which way market estimates bias the efficiency calculations is therefore syin
an empirical question. To the extent that the authors' work will invite ness
more careful empirical work measuring the benefits and costs of take- wou
overs, it is a very welcome contribution. The TWA case study in par- fron ticular provides compelling evidence that market value changes muc overestimated the benefits, but that is thin evidence from which to
generalize.
M Shleifer and Summers pursue a second efficiency theme that is more expl controversial and rather independent of the ex post measurements dis-
selv cussed above. They argue that takeovers will interfere with efficient they long-term contracting. The hypothesis is that the rents that raiders dict
capture in a takeover are part of an efficient implicit contract between mer
sym
Bengt Holmstrom is the Edwin J. Beinecke Professor of Management Studies and mist professor of economics at the School of Organization and Management, Yale University.
This work was supported by funds from the National Science Foundation and the the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, cost
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the firm and its stakeholders. Once it becomes known that those rents
will not be possible to appropriate, because of the threat of takeovers,
enforcement costs will go up. Thus, even if the above ex post welfare
'e of calculation comes out even, the takeover should be deemed socially
undesirable on grounds of ex ante efficiency losses. Needless to say,
lety: the increased costs of contracting are very hard to assess empirically,
hard but as I will argue later they may be of less concern as well.
I do not find entirely convincing the authors' particular theory of
takeovers' being motivated by gains from breaching implicit contracts,
nor do I agree with all the welfare implications their logic suggests. In
response, I will offer some alternative views. Since we do not have
any good models of the takeover process as yet, my own ideas are as
speculative as the authors'. I feel a bit diffident about the exercise,
med however, since in the near future our understanding may improve sub-
e a stantially through theoretical work. I am thinking of the recent inter-
and esting papers by Hams and Raviv (1987) and Grossman and Hart (1987),
ibly which seem to provide the proper setting for analyzing the motives for
and takeovers as well as their welfare implications.
effi- The authors correctly recognize that for their breach theory to hold
:ock up logically, there must be an asymmetry between the raider and the
luse incumbent management. If not, both would breach under the same
:iple circumstances, and no takeover would be necessary. What I find less
ders plausible -is the particular asymmetry that the paper focuses on. The
ins, claim is that shareholders choose trustworthy managers and entrench
I be them in their positions to facilitate efficient long-term contracting. The
the choice of a trustworthy manager acts as a commitment device. The
to a authors are led to this logic because the reputation arguments, which
ther would typically be used to explain implicit contracting, are forward
IOfl. looking and would therefore seem to put raiders and management in a
fore symmetric position. In fact, this need not be the case. If the trustworthi-
vite ness of a manager is unknown, a breach of promise by the manager
ake- would be costly. By contrast, the raider need not lose any reputation
par- from a breach because he never made any promise. But I do not place
iges much faith in this logic either. I think that reputations are involved,
h to but in a different manner.
My main problem with the entrenchment logic is that it does not iore explain why present shareholders could not capture the rents them-
•
1S selves. Since shareholders are assumed to be able to select managers,
••ien they should also be able to replace those managers when interests so ers dictate. In the authors' theory the decision to breach a contract is ieen merely moved one step up (to shareholders) without altering the basic
symmetry problem that the authors were careful to address in dis-
missing the standard reputation argument. While entrenchment implies
d the the added costs of capturing rents, these costs (as well as the increased
costs of contracting) have to be borne equally by the raider and the58AndreiShielferand Lawrence H. Summers S9
shareholders. Moreover, it would seem that shareholders would gain comf(
more from ousting their trustworthy managers because the rents they mid-c
can thereby capture will not be shared with anybody else. (Raiders shifts
have to share a substantial portion of the gains with shareholders—not are
because this is a common values auction, but rather because share- Thi
holders can free-ride). My conclusion is that if one takes seriously the vatia
notion that management is selected by shareholders, takeovers should their
not occur, at least not because of the breach motive suggested in the The
paper. not f
Besides this logical problem the evidence in the paper that managers small
resist takeovers because they are trustworthy and concerned about case,
stakeholders seems thin. In the TWA case, for instance, management game
had a bad relationship with workers (who subsequently were deprived That
of some rents). And the comments made about white knights, who supp
"have a shade of grey" and proceed to capture rents themselves, speak press
against the authors' theory. On a more casual level I think one could emer
collect plenty of evidence indicating that managers are quite capable agers
of ignoring broader social concerns and breaching trust when doing so can
in their own interest.
Thus, I would prefer a theory of takeovers that does not rely on the capti
selection of trustworthy managers. It is possible to construct a theory can
within the standard rational framework that assumes managers are as raise
self-interested as everyone else. I have in mind the following story. that
Managers' behavior is dictated by career concerns. They value their cieni
job because of the rents they can enjoy in their managerial position. cons
Their rent-seeking is constrained only by the interests of constituent emp
groups and threats from raiders. Much like politicians, managers need
to enjoy the support of their constituents—shareholders, employees, of a
and other stakeholders. Among those constituents, shareholders may poin
be a relatively weak group because of the familiar problems with co- map
ordinating the actions of a widely dispersed ownership. Their weakness 0
may in turn lead management to cater more to the interests of em- coni
ployees, for instance, particularly if the latter are organized and strong. inco
It is much more comfortable to have a good relationship than a bad thes
one with employees, as long as the shareholders do not object too be
strongly. This story, rather than that of implicit contracting, explains lead
the rents that workers enjoy. cost
But why are the raiders in a better position to capture rents than mar
either management or shareholders? For shareholders my answer is
that coordination problems make it difficult for them to act in unison
and capture rents. On the other hand, and this is a central ingredient, inno
raidersenjoy an advantage over managers in enacting changes because way
theytypically come in with a reputation for toughness. Managers who
have previously given in to labor demands in order to enjoy a more repu59 Breach of Trust inHostile Takeovers
gain comfortable life will not be able to shift their negotiation position in
they mid-course. As recent reputation theories would indicate, any such
ders shift would not be credible in the eyes of workers. By contrast; raiders
—not are not burdened by a reputation for weakness)
iare- This reputation theory is quite consistent with the authors' obser-
vation that raiders tend to go after firms in industries very distinct from
ould their own (an observation that plays no role in the authors' theory).
the The returns to raiders come from general bargaining advantages and
not from specific knowledge of an industry (witness that their staff is
gers small as well). The theory also accords with the particulars of the TWA
bout case, including the fact that Carl Icahn is known as a hard-nosed bar-
nent gainer and more than willing to promote an unpleasant image of himself.
•ived That unionized labor receives premium salaries (around 15 percent)
who supports the notion that managers are willing to give away rents if
•teak pressed hard enough. Finally, my logic is not inconsistent with the
ould emergence of white knights, who presumably are called in by the man-
able agers to save their jobs and help with capturing rents before the raider
g so can get to them.
Having sketched an alternative theory of why there are rents to be
the captured and why a raider rather than shareholders or management
can go after them successfully, let me turn to the efficiency questions
e as raised in the paper. To the extent that my story is correct, it suggests
ory. that one should be much more concerned about the potential ineffi-
heir ciencics that might accompany concessions by management to various
ion, constituent groups. For instance, excess wages could seriously distort
lent employment decisions. More generally, one is led back to the traditional
iced concern that management may not operate the firm efficiently because
ees, of agency problems. Of course, this in no way invalidates the general
nay point that measuring efficiency gains from changes in stock price is
co- inappropriate.
tess On the other hand, even if one believes that takeovers increase
em- contracting costs (which I do to some extent, as the proposition is not
)ng. inconsistent with my reputation story), it should be emphasized that
bad these costs, as far as the targeted firm is concerned, are not ones to
too be added into an efficiency calculation. (The paper may give the mis-
ains leading impression that they should.) It is important to note that these
costs are already accounted for in the evaluation of the post-takeover
han market value of the firms and the raider's rational decision to buy.
r is
son L. One might ask why managers do not bargain hard given the expectation of takeovers.
I think the answer is that the recent boom in hostile takeovers came as a surprise. The
ent, innovation that was not expected was the emergence of an inexpensive and expedient
use way to raise substantial amounts of capital for the takeover. Given the low probability
of such an event, the managers would not care to push on the bargaining side. Presumably
they will try ex post, but they cannot do that as effectively as the raider, given their past
ore reputation. -60Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 61i
Consequently, the estimation of cost increases in the acquired firm is Refere
of no concern in assessing welfare. GrosSn
The only issue is what externalities a contract breach can have. The for c
authors mention that a spreading fear of takeovers can jeopardize other Tech
firms' contracting opportunities. This is possible, but the paper does Harris,
not provide much supporting evidence. It is not relevant that the work- and
ers in firms that have been taken over feel a lost loyalty, as I argued
above. (The anecdotal evidence at the end of the paper appears to be
of this kind). Instead, one should focus on those firms that might be Corr
futuretargets. Are the workers there worried? Do they respond to the
new reality by demanding higher initial wages, as the implicit contract The ii
logic would suggest? I do not know what the facts are here. On the
other hand, casual observation indicates that managers will spend sub- in ma
stantial energy on defensive activities, including the inefficient restruc- natior
turing of firms. My guess is that these costs are in the end more significant an
than the problems with contracting.2 redist]
Evidently, the factors to consider in any policy decision about take- will ol
overs are many and difficult to evaluate. I do not deny that implicit in the
contracting could be an important element, but I think the chapter Ex1
jumps too quickly to welfare conclusions based on a theory I find cuts
somewhat implausible. In asking whether society should intervene and An al
how, one must appreciate the fact that laws cannot be written in a very reduc
idiosyncratic fashion. It is hard to discriminate between cases in which wage
welfare is enhanced and cases in which welfare is reduced by takeovers.
Many takeovers are of social value, as discussed for instance in Brown ificati
and Medoff's chapter in this volume. One should also wait for natural Th
responses to takeovers (resistance measures by management and re- ativel
visions in corporate charters). Our capitalist economy has proved quite in ad
inventive before. For instance, if firms find ways to alter their charters whici
so that they can choose any likelihood of takeover that they desire at then I
alow cost, there is no reason for the government to intervene with the
purpose of limiting takeovers. In this case the externality costs from I h
fear would disappear. To this hotly debated issue the best response orgar
may therefore be to stay cool and watch from the sidelines until further qualil
evidence accumulates and until we find some firmer theoretical ground This
for assessing the motives and implications of takeovers, or au
WI
2. Incidentally, there is a reverse externality that tends to reduce the number of oses takeovers. Potential raiders are presumably uncertain about success. Every time a take-
over is attempted, it provides information about success rates, including the costs of beha'
raising the required capital and the resistance methods that management might use. deter
Thus, the takeover is an experiment of social value (if takeovers are desirable), but only
a small fraction of that value accrues to the raider because of the public goods nature
of information. The recent boom in (hostile) takeover activity is indicative of such an
externality. Organi
'-461 Breachof Trust in HostileTakeovers
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tothe
ntract Theincreased valuationofthe combinedequity securitiesof firms
nthe involvedin a takeover isoftenattributed to prospective improvements
sub- in managerial efficiency. Shleifer and Summers argue that this expla-
struc- nation is too simple. They observe that many takeovers bring about
an expropriation of rents. To a first approximation, these takeovers are
redistributionat rather than efficiency enhancing. Indeed, social losses
take- will obtain if, as a secondary or systems consequence, confidence (trust)
iplicit in the contracting process is lost.
apter Expropriation is not, however, the only interpretation for the wage
I find cuts that attend the takeovers to which Shleifer and Summers refer.
e and An alternative and, I submit, more plausible interpretation is that a
very reduction in the scope of managerial discretion is responsible for the
which wage cuts in question. Before sketching these rival wage cut scenar-
wers. ios—expropriation and managerial discretion—and their welfare ram-
rown ifications, I will briefly raise a question of theoretical perspective.
atural The study of economic organization is both very complex and rel-
re- atively undeveloped. Under these circumstances there are advantages
quite in adopting a "main case" perspective. Rival main case candidates—
irters which include economizing, monopoly, and issues of power—should
ire at then be required to show their hand. What are the implications of each,
th the and what do the data support?
from i have argued elsewhere that the economizing approach to economic
)onse organization, with special reference to economizing on transaction costs,
rther qualifies (comparatively) for main case standing (Williamson 1985, 1987).
•ound This fact does not, however, preclude the possibility that other ancillary
or auxiliary purposes are also served. How do we evaluate these?
Whereas the main case presumably applies in general, auxiliary pur-
a take- poses are apt to be associated with special preconditions. Strategic
osts of behavior by established firms that is designed to discipline rivals or
use. deter market entry, for example, is viable only if supported by preexisting
Ut only
nature
uch an Oliver E. Williamson is the Gordon B. Tweedy Professor of Economics of Law and
Organization at Yale University.62Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 63
market power. One useful way of discriminating among alternative On the
auxiliarypurposes, therefore, is to ask whether the requisite precon-
ditions are satisfied. I suggest that this course be followed in attempting be gre
to choose among alternative explanations for the takeover-induced wage in the
cuts that are of concern to Shleifer and Summers.
and (2 The condition of asset specificity plays a key role in the study of goals.
contract (Williamson 1975, 1985; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978)
Thi and features prominently in the Shleifer and Summers expropriation in the
scenario. The basic argument is this: Constituencies that make durable argun
firm-specific investments are exposed to the hazard of expropriation that a unless special efforts are made to safeguard these investments. Long- throu
term contracts supported by protective governance structures are thus discrl
favored wherever asset specificity is great. Selecting managers who Wh
exhibit integrity and exude trust helps to supply this contractual glue. organ
An equilibrium set of contracts with managers operating as trustees of ma
can be upset, however, by the appearance of a takeover. The would- Thus,
be takeover agent offers a bribe to one of the constituencies, namely, quent
the shareholders, to sell out. The successful takeover agent then dis- mark,
misses the incumbent (trustee) managers and abrogates the contractual nopol
understanding that had hitherto prevailed. Workers with firm-specific maxil
skills are advised that wages will be slashed by 20 or 30 percent. Be- and
cause their skills are imperfectly redeployable, the workers accept this
deal. trust
Inasmuch as the wage bill in most firms is very large in relation to in th
profits, a 20 or 30 percent wage cut can have huge consequences for cuts
profitability. The existence of firm-specific labor (and other firm-specific To
factors, such as specialized suppliers) thus represents an enormous pose
inducement to a raider. conc
As Shleifer and Summers point out, the expropriation from labor has entry
immediate redistributional effects. It also has continuing contractual Hick
effects, as employees find their confidence (trust) in the contracting conti
process shaken. Future workers will contract much more carefully, whici
refuse to tailor their human assets to the firm, or both. A pervasive Gr
erosion of trust would have adverse systems effects as well, whence uniot
both local and global allocative efficiency losses could result. fortF
The managerial discretion models maintain that managers operate and I
the firm with reference to their own interests, subject to the condition shar
that their jobs not be jeopardized by sales, growth, or other management-
favored goals.' The refutable implications of these models turn critically 2.
activit I. Baumol's (1958) sales maximization hypothesis was the first of the managerial
discretion models. Marris (1964) subsequently argued that managers were given to growth by the
maximization, and I (1964) postulated a managerial utility function that featured an
cretio 'expense
by Gr63Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
rnative on the proposition that the scope of managerial discretion varies sys-
tematically with circumstances. The scope of discretion is assumed to
mpting be greater in the degree to which (1) firms are relieved from competition
d wage in the product market, (2) competition in capital market forces is weak,
and (3) the organization of the firm supports the pursuit of ancillary
udy of goals.
1978) This Comment focuses on changes in the condition of competition
nation in the product market as these relate to wage behavior. The general
urable argument is this: Firms that operate in highly concentrated industries
nation that are difficult to enter or in regulated industries that allow the pass-
Long- through of costs and prohibit entry are especially given to managerial
'e thus discretion (Williamson 1964; Alchian 1965).
s who What has been referred to as the agency theory approach to economic
1 glue. organization expressly takes exception to the proposition that the scope
ustees of managerial discretion varies with competition in the product market.
would- Thus, Jensen and Meckling (1976, 317) have observed that "it is fre-
amely, quently argued that the existence of competition in the product
dis- markets will constrain the behavior of managers ...,i.e.,that mo-
actual nopoly in product markets will permit larger divergences from value
pecific maximization. Our analysis does not support this hypothesis." Shleifer
it. Be- and Summers rely on the Jensen and Meckling nexus of a contract
pt this conception of the firm and, as set out above, appeal to breaches of
trust (breakdowns in the contractual relationship), rather than to changes
:ion to in the condition of product market competition, in explaining the wage
for cuts that attend the takeovers in question.2
pecific To examine the alternative explanation—managerial discretion—sup-
rmous pose at the outset that the firms in question are operating in highly
concentrated industries where entry is difficult, perhaps even where
or has entry is prohibited by regulation. Suppose further that managers have
actual Hicksian preferences for a "quiet life." And suppose finally that the
acting contractual relationship between the firm and each constituency with
efuily, which management must deal has an influence on managerial tranquility.
iasive Granting wage concessions, especially in the face of a strong labor
hence union, is an obvious way by which to promote labor peace. Assume,
for the sake of argument, that the managements of firms in monopolistic
perate and regulated industries do make such wage concessions. Although
dition shareholders will be temporarily disadvantaged as wages intrude on
tically 2. Jensen has more recently embraced the managerial discretion view (which he char-
acterizes, however, as the "free cash flow" hypothesis). Thus, he now maintains that
'product and factor market disciplinary forces are often weaker in new activities and
rn erial activities that involve substantial economic rents or quasirents. In these cases, monitoring
growth by the firm's internal control system and the market for corporate control are more
ired an important" (1986, 323). In effect, free cash flow is a specialization of managerial dis-
cretion theory. It usefully focuses attention on financial issues akin to those addressed
by Grossman and Hart (1982).64Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers 65 Breai
profits,share prices will thereafter adjust to reflect the reduced prof- P
itability. Partial profit recoupment may be effected, moreover, by rais-
ing product prices without inviting entry. A stable, easy life equilibrium
in which labor is bribed to cooperate thereby results.
Suppose now that a disturbance appears. One possible disturbance
is that the government removes the protective mantle of regulation.
Another is that import barriers come down so that foreign producers
become more viable alternative sources of supply. Entry by new firms
that are not subject to the modus vivendi regarding wages now threat-
ens. What to do?
One possibility is for the incumbent managements to roll back the
earlier wage concessions, thereby to meet any new competition on
parity wage terms. By assumption, however, the incumbent managers
still value the quiet life, and labor can be expected to greet the proposal
with a storm of protest. Another possibility is for a new management
team to form that is better suited to deal with (indeed, may value)
turbulence. But how to effect the change?
Since the incumbent managers like their jobs, their voluntarily quit-
ting is not in prospect. And since they will rebuff the offer of a new
management team to supplant the incumbents, an involuntary means Fig.
of displacement will need to be employed. Suppose that the new man-
agement team turns to the shareholders and proposes a takeover by
no paying a premium over the (now reduced) share prices. Assume that
the shareholders approve. The takeover and subsequent renegotiation
of wages that Shleifer and Summers describe follows.
If Whereas the Shleifer and Summers scenario assumes that managers we
dt are trustees and focuses on firms in which labor has made significant are
firm-specific investments, the scenario I describe instead assumes that
igu
managers are given to managerial discretion and focuses on industries
where the condition of competition has changed. Specifically, the man-
agerial discretion scenario focuses on those industries that once were cos S
difficult to enter but where now entry impediments have been relieved. atten
(The U.S. automobile industry exhibits some of this attribute. Indus-
e
tries that have recently been deregulated and whose principal durable reason
investments are mobile—such as airlines and trucking—are even better
of the examples.)
Thus, whereas all firms in which labor has made significant firm- n'e
specific investments are potential expropriation candidates under the
neutral nexus-of-contract hypothesis, the managerial nexus hypothesis rrn-1
looks to conditions that would support managerial discretion3 and asks
if entry restrictions have significantly eased. the ta
3. The argumentcan be refined with reference to organizationalform. The basic This i
argumenthere follows the M-form hypothesis (Williamson 1975. 150—5 1), to wit: U-form










i now turn to the welfare geometry of the two scenarios. Whether
managers behave as trustees (the Shleifer and Summers scenario) or
tilt the enterprise in favor of the quiet life (as sketched above), the
welfare ramifications can, to a first approximation, be assessed in stan-
dard terms of partial equilibrium welfare economics.
Figure 1sets out the basic geometry. in the figure refers to
average costs in the pretakeover era. To keep things simple, assume
that price (F1) is equal to AC1. AC2 is the level to which pecuniary
costs fall as a result of the forced renegotiation of labor contracts that
attends the takeover.
Shleifer and Summers treat the workers as locked in to the firm, by
reason of firm-specific human capital, and thus the area A2 is trans-
formed from wages to profits under this scenario. The real productivity
of the workers is nonetheless reflected by however. Accordingly,
new entrants cannot come in and sell at less than P1 simply by paying
a low wage—because the incumbent workers who have built up their
firm-specific capital in the established firms will outperform the inex-
perienced, new workers. Until the incumbent workers retire, therefore,
the area A2 is the initial and continuing profit gain that is realized by
the takeover—wage cut scenario described by Shleifer and Summers.4
This is a redistribution.
4. This geometry assumes that (I) the incumbent workers' productivity does not drop
and (2) the existing rivals maintain the price P1 despite reduced pecuniary costs.
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The scenario that I describe also involves an initial shift in amount The
A2 from wages to profits. Assuming, however, that AC1 does not reflect tended by
a payment for productivity but is an "easy life" premium instead, the (greater i
price P1 will be subject to competitive erosion. New rivalry appears, propriatic
something akin to a Schumpeterian "handing on" process ensues, and product p
the prices (P2) will be bid down to the level AC2. The profit gains are wages an
thus transitional. The area A2 in the final equilibrium becomes con- Which
sumer surplus. The triangle A4 is an allocative efficiency gain, of the dat
Shleifer and Summers aver that the workers who experience the are nonet
expropriation will be loath to contract with firms in the same trust-
worthy manner as they did in the post-takeover era. Either they will R f contract much more carefully, thereby to protect their firm-specific e erenc
human capital against any further expropriation, or they will refuse to Aichian,
specialize their human assets (or some combination thereof). Pervasive manage
systems effects may also obtain, as interested observers thereafter 30—41.
negotiate more cautiously as well. The allocative efficiency losses of
moving from a high-trust to a low-trust culture must be counted as a Grossmai
social cost of takeovers. managl
The managerial discretion hypothesis treats the high wages in the J. MeC
pretakeover era as a bribe. The lucky beneficiaries realize a windfall Jensen,
that evaporates upon takeover. But possibly the situation is more corn-
plicated than this. The beneficiaries are workers who have made special behavi
efforts to qualify for high-paying jobs through pre-positioning. They nomic.
haveincurred special costs of obtaining credentials (see the rent trans- Klein, B
formation literature: Krueger 1974; Posner 1975; Tullock 1967), and gratiol
they may be overqualified as a consequence. Krueg:r
The welfare ramifications of takeovers are therefore complicated Amerl
under the managerial discretion hypothesis as well. Workers here may Marris, I
also feel ajustifiable sense of expropriation. They likewise may attempt Free I
•1 tocontract more carefully thereafter. But these workers may also be Posner,
deterred from rent transformation once they realize that wage premia Tuck
invite takeovers. This is a mixed picture. Affair
In conclusion, although most takeovers are not attended by large
wage cuts, some are, and therefore we must ask what factors are
associated with wage cut outcomes. The two alternative scenarios dis- William
cussed here have somewhat different foci of attention. Whereas the
WO
expropriation scenario assumes that pretakeover managers are trust
ees,the managerial discretion scenario assumes that pretakeover man-
agerssacrifice profits in favor of the quiet life. Labor, under the persp
expropriation scenario, is highly firm-specific, whereas labor can be
either specific or nonspecific under the managerial discretion hypoth-
5 esis. Probably the most telling difference between these two scenarios ion
is the importance each attaches to competition in the product market. explanat67Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers
The managerial discretion hypothesis assumes that wage cuts are at-
reflect tended by (indeed, induced by) increased product market competition
Ld, the (greater import competition, deregulation, or the like), while the ex-
pears, propriation scenario is silent in this respect. Finally, whereas both
s, and product prices and wages fall under the managerialist explanation, only
ns are wages are reduced under expropriation.5
s con- Which hypothesis is most powerful awaits a systematic development
of the data. The specific examples to which Shleifer and Summers refer
ce the are nonetheless congruent with the managerialist interpretation.
trust-
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